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The present research tested 2 competing models specifying how 2 traits (concern with the well-being of
others and self-control) interact to predict forgiveness. According to the compensatory model, forgive-
ness requires being high on either trait; according to the synergistic model, forgiveness requires being
high on both traits. Two preliminary studies demonstrated the main effect of trait (Study 1a) and primed
(Study 1b) self-control on forgiveness. Three primary studies consistently supported the compensatory
model in predicting willingness to forgive a partner who behaves noncooperatively in a 2-alternative
prisoner’s dilemma (Study 2), a continuous give-some dilemma (Study 3), and a 2-alternative maximiz-
ing difference game (Study 4). Among proselfs or those low in trait forgiveness, trait self-control
positively related to forgiveness, suggesting that self-control can compensate for a lack of concern with
others’ well-being. Implications for theory and research on forgiveness are discussed.
Keywords: forgiveness, trait self-control, social value orientation, social dilemmas
Forgiveness is a linchpin in successful relationships (Karremans
& Van Lange, 2008; McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Wor-
thington, & Rachal, 1997; Tsang, McCullough, & Fincham, 2006;
Worthington, Witvliet, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007) and an important
determinant of psychological well-being (Bono, McCullough, &
Root, 2008; Karremans, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003;
Lawler et al., 2003). One factor that influences willingness to
forgive is an individual’s personality.
Prior research linking personality with forgiveness has impli-
cated a variety of traits. The majority of this work suggests that the
forgivers of the world are basically “nice” people who are high in
agreeableness (e.g., Leach & Lark, 2004; McCullough & Hoyt,
2002) or empathy (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson,
2001; McCullough et al., 1997, 1998; for a recent review, see Fehr,
Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). More recent work suggests that the
world’s forgivers may also be “smart” people who are high in trait
self-control (Finkel & Campbell, 2001) or executive functioning
(Pronk, Karremans, Overbeek, Vermulst, & Wigboldus, 2010).
Integrating these two lines of research, the present work poses the
following questions: Can a high level of trait self-control predict
higher levels of forgiveness even among people with a proself
orientation? Can a prosocial orientation positively relate to for-
giveness even among those with a low level of trait self-control?
Or does forgiveness require both a prosocial orientation and high
trait self-control?
To address these questions, we advance a Trait  Trait
Interactionist perspective on forgiveness that gives rise to two
competing theoretical models. Though both models are
grounded in work on forgiveness and social interdependence
theory, the models offer a notably different pattern of predic-
tions. The compensatory model predicts that forgiveness re-
quires a prosocial orientation or high self-control, and the
synergistic model assumes that forgiveness requires both. We
test these competing models across three primary studies ex-
ploring willingness to forgive an interaction partner who be-
haves noncooperatively in a social dilemma.
Social Dilemmas: A Rich Context for Studying
Forgiveness
Social dilemmas pose a conflict between short-term self-interest
and long-term collective interests (Komorita & Parks, 1994). The
best known paradigm for studying social dilemmas is the two-
person prisoner’s dilemma. In a prisoner’s dilemma, the coopera-
tive option appeals to altruists and cooperators because it maxi-
mizes the partner’s gain, joint gain, and equality, and the
noncooperative option appeals to individualists, competitors, and
aggressors because it maximizes individual gain and relative gain
and minimizes the partner’s gain (Van Lange, De Cremer, Van
Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007).
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Laboratory-based models such as the prisoner’s dilemma pro-
vide an exceptional context within which to study forgiveness, for
at least two reasons (cf. Wallace, Exline, & Baumeister, 2008).
First, the selfish–cooperative trade-off that they model is perva-
sive in real life. One can find social dilemmas at work (e.g.,
slacking on vs. contributing to a collaborative project) or at home
(e.g., leaving vs. cleaning one’s dirty dishes), in dyads (e.g., a
husband and wife) or in groups (e.g., a large coalition). Across
various settings, people must often choose between pursuing their
own short-term self-interest or the long-term interests of a dyad or
a group. Second, it is well known that when others fail to cooperate
in social dilemma studies, people become angry (Dawes,
McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) and routinely adopt a tit-for-tat
strategy, eventually assimilating to the noncooperative behavior of
their partner (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello,
1975; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). Thus, noncooperative behavior
in social dilemmas is likely to elicit a desire for revenge, which, by
definition, is antithetical to forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1998,
2001). That said, if people never forgive interaction partners in
social dilemmas, they may hurt the ones they love or prematurely
terminate an otherwise rewarding relationship. In other words,
noncooperation in social dilemmas gives rise to a host of compet-
ing motives (desire for revenge vs. concern with others and the
long-term viability of a relationship) that offer a rich context in
which to study forgiveness.
Transformation of Motivation in Social Dilemmas
The majority of social dilemmas involve repeated interactions
that play out over time. As such, most social dilemmas involve two
distinct motivational conflicts of interest: a social conflict (be-
tween individual and collective interests) and a temporal conflict
(between immediate and delayed interests; Messick & McClelland,
1983). According to interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996), when people are faced with
mixed-motive situations such as social dilemmas, their gut reaction
is to satisfy short-term self-interest. These immediate gut-level,
self-interested preferences are contained in what Kelley and Thi-
baut referred to as the “given matrix.” Although the given matrix
may underlie the response of certain individuals, many people are
assumed to base their response on a “transformed effective matrix”
that takes into account broader social and temporal motivations
(e.g., concern with the well-being of others and/or concern with the
long-term consequences of one’s actions). Several researchers
have suggested that both forgiveness (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro,
& Hannon, 2002; Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; McCullough,
2001) and the closely related notion of accommodation (Finkel &
Campbell, 2001; Perunovic & Holmes, 2008; Rusbult, Verette,
Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994)
depend significantly on an individual’s willingness to transform
the given matrix into an effective matrix on the basis of (a) broader
social motivations, (b) broader temporal motivations, and/or (c)
the ability to exert self-control (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Finkel
& Rusbult, 2008; Righetti, Finkenauer, & Finkel, 2011). Below,
we discuss how these three factors give rise to two taxonomies
underlying forgiveness and two competing models for predicting
forgiveness.
Taxonomies Underlying Forgiveness
Social  Temporal Motivations
If we assume that social and temporal motivations are inde-
pendent, it is possible to cross them within a 2 (social motiva-
tions)  2 (temporal motivations) space. This 2  2 space gives
rise to the four distinct “motivational orientations” shown in the
top left part of Figure 1. In this space, individuals high in social
and temporal motivations are labeled future-oriented prosocials
(upper right quadrant); those low in social motivations but high
in temporal motivations are labeled future-oriented proselfs
(lower right quadrant); those low in social motivations and low
in temporal motivations are labeled present-oriented proselfs
(lower left quadrant); and those high in social motivations and
low in temporal motivations are labeled present-oriented proso-
cials (upper left quadrant).
Motivation  Ability
An alternative interdependence-based approach to forgiveness
suggests that forgiveness occurs when people have both the mo-
tivation and ability to forgive (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Righetti
& Finkenauer, 2011). Assuming that motivation and ability are
independent, it is possible to cross them within a 2 (motivation) 
2 (ability) space. This 2  2 space gives rise to the four distinct
“orientations” shown in the top right part of Figure 1. Because half
of the orientations assume low motivation, we do not refer to these
as “motivational” orientations but rather as orientations in general.
In this space, people are assumed to fall into one of four types:
highly motivated and able to forgive (upper right quadrant); not
motivated but able to forgive (lower right quadrant); not motivated
and not able to forgive (lower left quadrant); and highly motivated
but unable to forgive (upper left quadrant).
Compensatory vs. Synergistic Models of Forgiveness
Both of the taxonomies just outlined predict an interaction
between their respective dimensions. However, the nature of those
interactions is notably different, and this difference has important
implications for work on forgiveness. In particular, the Social 
Temporal taxonomy leads to a compensatory model, and the
Motivation  Ability taxonomy leads to a synergistic model. The
compensatory model suggests that as long as individuals have high
social motivations or high temporal motivations, they will be
motivated to forgive. In other words, high social motivations can
compensate for low temporal motivations (present-oriented proso-
cials will be motivated to forgive), and high temporal motivations
can compensate for low social motivations (future-oriented pro-
selfs will also be motivated to forgive). The synergistic model, by
comparison, suggests that individuals must have both high moti-
vation and high ability to forgive.
Personality Dimensions Underlying Compensatory
and Synergistic Models
Although the compensatory and synergistic models lead to
different predictions, the personality dimensions assumed to
underlie the two models are remarkably similar, namely, trait
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concern with the well-being of others and trait self-control.1
The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the
competing (Trait  Trait) interactions predicted by the com-
pensatory and synergistic models. In both models, the x-axis
corresponds to trait self-control; its underlying interpretation,
however, depends on the model. In the compensatory model on
the left, trait self-control is thought to motivate forgiveness due
to its association with a concern with the long-term conse-
quences of one’s actions. In the synergistic model on the right,
trait self-control is thought to facilitate forgiveness as an ability
to engage in self-regulation. In both models, the upper line
denotes the predicted pattern for those high in trait concern with
the well-being of others (i.e., prosocials or those high in trait
forgiveness), and the lower line denotes the predicted pattern
for those low in trait concern with the well-being of others (i.e.,
proselfs or those low in trait forgiveness).
Statistically Testing the Competing Models
Both of the models shown in the bottom of Figure 1 predict
an interaction between trait self-control and trait concern with
the well-being of others, but the pattern of simple slopes differs
between the models. Support for the compensatory model holds
if (a) self-control shows a positive relationship with forgiveness
among proselfs, (b) self-control shows no relationship with
forgiveness among prosocials, (c) prosocials low in self-control
are higher in forgiveness than proselfs low in self-control, and
(d) prosocials high in self-control show the same level of
forgiveness as proselfs high in self-control. Support for the
synergistic model holds if (a) self-control shows a positive
relationship with forgiveness among prosocials, (b) self-control
shows no relationship with forgiveness among proselfs, (c)
prosocials high in self-control are higher in forgiveness than
proselfs high in self-control, and (d) prosocials low in self-
control show the same level of forgiveness as proselfs low in
self-control.
On the Viability of the Competing Models
In the present section, we briefly consider the viability of the
competing models. Although no single study has directly com-
pared the models’ ability to predict forgiveness in social dilemmas,
both models are well grounded in theory and research on social
interdependence theory.
Compensatory Model
The notion that temporal motivations can help motivate proselfs
to engage in prosocial behavior can be traced back to social
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van
Lange, 1996). Supporting this proposition, past research has shown
that individualists (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Van Lange,
Klapwijk, & Van Munster, 2011) and even competitors (Sheldon,
1999) can act in a prosocial manner when they realize that it is in
their long-term self-interest (cf. Axelrod, 1984; Kelley & Grzelak,
1972).
In addition, several recent studies have suggested that the
transformation of motivation from the given to the effective
matrix may be relatively automatic for prosocials. For example,
Balliet and Joireman (2010) recently showed that ego depletion
reduced proselfs’ concern with the well-being of others but had
no effect on prosocials, suggesting that cooperation may be
automatic for prosocials and may thus not require additional
trait self-control. In another study, Perunovic and Holmes
(2008) showed that those high in agreeableness were more
likely than those low in agreeableness to accommodate when
their partner engaged in rude behavior and, more important, that
the differences between those high versus low in agreeableness
were largest when responses were made under time pressure.
This further suggests that people who are predisposed to be
concerned with the well-being of others are likely to engage in
automatic accommodation (and, by extension, automatic for-
giveness). Last, Karremans and Aarts (2007) found that for-
giveness of a close other was unaffected by placing people
under time pressure. However, forgiveness of a nonclose other
was lower when people were placed under time pressure. This
suggests that at least for some people (e.g., a close partner or
friend), forgiveness does not require self-control. Taken to-
gether, these studies suggest that prosocials may forgive others
in a relatively automatic fashion and that forgiveness by proso-
cials is not likely to be adversely impacted by low trait self-
control. All in all, the studies just reviewed provide preliminary
support for the compensatory model of forgiveness.
Synergistic Model
The synergistic model’s assumption that social concerns in-
teract with ability to impact the transformation process is also
deeply rooted in social interdependence theory (e.g., Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996) and recent work on
forgiveness and accomomodation. For example, Pronk et al.
(2010) stated,
Although being motivated sometimes—perhaps even oftentimes—
may indeed lead to forgiveness, the motivation to forgive does not
always equal actual forgiveness (i.e., the reduction of negative feel-
ings and thoughts toward the offender reflected in the subjective
experience of having forgiven an offender; Karremans & Van Lange,
2008). That is, although an individual may truly be motivated and
willing to forgive an offending relationship partner (e.g., one’s
spouse), sometimes this person may simply not succeed in doing so,
still experiencing relatively low levels of forgiveness toward an of-
fender (Worthington, 2005). (p. 119)
1 Although prior research has shown that agreeableness and consci-
entiousness predict trait forgiveness (rs  .45 and .17, respectively;
Balliet, 2010), we chose to focus on how narrower band traits predict
forgiveness. Because each of the Big Five dimensions consists of
narrower facets (Costa & McCrae, 1992), it is possible that certain
facets are more (or less) relevant within a given context (cf. John &
Srivastava, 1999). For example, the relatively weak relationship just
noted between conscientiousness and forgiveness may be due to the fact
that certain facets of conscientiousness may be irrelevant to forgiveness
(e.g., orderliness). If true, it is likely that the impact of other, more
relevant facets of conscientiousness (e.g., self-control) is being masked
by the less relevant facets. Therefore, we elected to focus on narrower
band personality traits that are directly relevant to the two taxonomic
systems shown in Figure 1 and have received attention in past research
on forgiveness and social dilemmas.
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In their work on accomodation, Finkel and Campbell (2001) pro-
posed more specifically that
one can easily imagine an individual who is committed to his or her
romantic relationship but who fails to accommodate because of self-
control failure . . . . Despite the fact that his heart is in the right place,
his diminished ability resources might outweigh his motivation to
accommodate; he may fail to accommodate despite his desire to do so.
(p. 266)
Despite its clear articulation in the accommodation and forgive-
ness literatures, an interaction between ability and motivation, as
the synergistic model predicts, has been directly tested for by very
few studies. Empirical support for the synergistic model is based
largely on the finding that self-control ability positively relates to
forgiveness (e.g., Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Pronk et al., 2010;
Righetti et al., 2011). Although promising, the majority of this
work has focused on the main effect of self-control ability. To our
knowledge, Finkel and Campbell (2001, Study 3) are the only ones
to have tested for an interaction between motivation and ability.
Finkel and Campbell did not find the predicted (Motivation 
Ability) interaction, but additional tests of the model seem war-
ranted for at least three reasons. First, the synergistic model is
clearly guiding research on accommodation and forgiveness, at-
testing to its theoretical relevance and impact within these related
fields. Second, it is possible that the synergistic model may garner
stronger support when a different outcome is considered (e.g.,
forgiveness as opposed to accommodation), in different contexts
(e.g., lab-based social dilemmas as opposed to retrospective ac-
counts among dating couples), and with different operationaliza-
tions of motivation (e.g., trait concern with the well-being of others
as opposed to relationship commitment). Finally, to date, no study
has presented a competitive test of an alternative (compensatory)
model of forgiveness. By clearly articulating the compensatory and
synergistic models and pitting them against each other, the present
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Figure 1. Alternate taxonomies (Panel A) giving rise to compensatory versus synergistic models of forgiveness
(Panel B).
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paper adds additional clarity to the different ways in which moti-
vation, ability, and long-term orientation may interact to predict
forgiveness.
Trait Self-Control as Long-Term Orientation
and Ability
Finally, when considering the viability of the models, it is
important to note that trait self-control is associated with a concern
for the long-term consequences of one’s actions (a key assumption
of the compensatory model) as well as a heightened ability to
regulate one’s behavior (a key assumption of the synergistic
model). For example, in line with the compensatory model, those
scoring high on trait self-control score higher on Strathman,
Gleicher, Boninger, and Edwards’ (1994) consideration of future
consequences scale (e.g., Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg,
& Schultz, 2008). Moreover, in line with the synergistic model,
those scoring high on trait self-control have been shown to have a
stronger ability to engage in actual self-control behavior
(Schmeichel & Zell, 2007). Thus, trait self-control is equally
relevant to the compensatory and synergistic models.
Overview of Studies
Our primary goal in the present paper was to test the competing
interaction models shown in Figure 1. Prior to testing those mod-
els, we report two preliminary studies addressing the relationship
between self-control and forgiveness. In Study 1a, we evaluated
whether trait self-control predicts trait forgiveness, beyond trait
empathic concern and perspective taking, two important proximate
mechanisms of forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1997). In Study
1b, we examined whether priming self-control can increase self-
reported tendencies to forgive in a variety of hypothetical trans-
gression scenarios. In Studies 2 thru 4, we tested the competing
compensatory and synergistic models of forgiveness by examining
how trait self-control interacts with trait forgiveness (Study 2) and
social value orientation (Studies 3 and 4) to predict state forgive-
ness of a noncooperative response in a two-alternative prisoner’s
dilemma, a continuous give-some dilemma, and a two-alternative
maximizing difference game, respectively.
Study 1a: Does Trait Self-Control Predict Forgiveness
After Controlling for Empathy?
McCullough et al. (1997) identified empathic concern and per-
spective taking as the two most important intrapersonal causes of
forgiveness. The present analysis—consistent with both the syn-
ergistic and compensatory models—suggests that an understand-
ing of forgiveness can be further advanced by recognizing the role
of trait self-control. Accordingly, Study 1a tested whether trait
self-control predicts higher trait forgiveness, once variance in
empathic concern and perspective taking has been statistically
controlled.
Method
Participants and protocol. Students at a business school in
Singapore (N 391) completed three personality questionnaires in
groups ranging between 10 and 20 in exchange for course credit.
The questionnaires were stapled together and counterbalanced. In
each of the studies reported in this paper, prior to completing any
scales, participants signed an informed consent form. After they
had completed the study, participants were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.
Trait self-control. Trait self-control was assessed with Tang-
ney, Baumeister, and Boone’s (2004) 36-item self-control scale
(  .80). Two sample items include “I am good at resisting
temptation” and “I am self-indulgent at times” (recoded). Partici-
pants responded to each item on a 5-point scale (1  not at all like
me to 5 very much like me). After recoding, higher scores reflect
higher levels of trait self-control (M  3.12, SD  0.47).
Trait empathy scale. Trait empathy was assessed with two
seven-item subscales from Davis’ (1983) interpersonal reactivity
index (empathic concern and perspective taking). Empathic con-
cern taps feelings of warmth and tender concern for others (e.g., “I
would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person”;   .73).
Perspective taking measures the ability to take another’s point of
view (e.g., “I look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I
make a decision”;   .76). Participants responded to each item on
a 5-point scale (1  strongly disagree to 5  strongly agree).
After recoding, higher scores reflect higher levels of trait empathic
concern (M 3.76, SD 0.51) and perspective taking (M 3.57,
SD  0.56).
Trait forgiveness scale. The criterion variable was assessed
with Berry, Worthington, Parrott, O’Connor, and Wade’s (2005)
10-item trait forgiveness scale (  .83; all alphas reported in this
paper are based on data from the relevant study). Two example
items are “I am a forgiving person” and “If someone treats me
badly, I treat him or her the same” (recoded). Participants re-
sponded to each item on a 5-point scale (1  strongly disagree to
5  strongly agree). After recoding, higher scores reflect greater
trait forgiveness (M  3.23, SD  0.73).
Results and Discussion
Our primary goal in the present study was to determine whether
trait self-control would predict trait forgiveness once variance in
empathic concern and perspective taking had been statistically
controlled. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a two-step re-
gression analysis. On Step 1, we entered empathic concern and
perspective taking. As expected, empathic concern and perspective
taking explained a significant amount of the variance in trait
empathy, R2  .12, F(2, 389)  25.46, p  .001. On Step 2, we
entered trait self-control. After controlling for empathic concern
and perspective taking, trait self-control explained an additional
4% of the variance in trait forgiveness,   .21, t(388) 4.12, p
.001, and empathic concern and perspective taking continued to
show a significant positive relationship with trait forgiveness,  
.13 and .21, t(388)  2.66 and 4.17, ps  .008, respectively.
Adding the interactions between perspective-taking and empathic
concern with self-control did not explain any additional variation
in trait forgiveness. The present results reconfirm that trait empa-
thy is an important predictor of forgiveness and show that trait
self-control plays an additional role in predicting forgiveness.
Nevertheless, due to the correlational nature of the findings, it is
unclear whether self-control actually leads to forgiveness. In Study
1b, we evaluated this assumption directly by priming self-control
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and measuring tendencies to forgive in hypothetical transgression
scenarios.
Study 1b: Does Priming Self-Control Increase
Forgiveness?
Method
Participants and protocol. Students at a business school in
Singapore (N  49) participated for course credit. Participants
arrived at the lab in groups of eight and were seated in private
cubicles. Participants were randomly assigned to a control condi-
tion or a self-control prime condition in which they were instructed
to write about some aspect of their life. Participants in the control
condition were told, “For the next 10–12 minutes, please think
carefully about and describe in detail what you did yesterday.”
Participants in the self-control prime condition were told, “For the
next 10–12 minutes, please think carefully about and describe in
detail a time when you demonstrated good self-control. This would
be an experience when you were tempted to do something that
might not have been good for you, but you were able to be
level-headed, cautious, and patient, allowing you to overcome
those temptations.” After 10 minutes of writing, all participants
completed the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness.
Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness. Berry, Wor-
thington, Parrott, O’Connor, and Wade’s (2001) Transgression
Narrative Test of Forgiveness presents five hypothetical scenarios
that ask the respondent to imagine a known other committing a
specific transgression against the respondent. For example, in one
scenario, participants are asked to imagine that a fellow classmate
copies and turns in as their own work a paper that the participant
had already finished for a class. When the instructor notices the
plagiarized work, she calls them both in and reprimands them.
Following each scenario, the respondent indicates how likely he or
she would be to forgive the other on a 5-point scale (1  definitely
not forgive to 5  definitely forgive). Higher scores indicate
greater amounts of forgiveness. Originally, the scale was devel-
oped as a measure of trait forgiveness. We reasoned, however, that
because it deals with specific hypothetical transgressions, it could
also be used as a measure of state forgiveness that might be
susceptible to manipulation. We averaged over the five scenarios
on the forgiveness scale prior to analysis to create a single will-
ingness to forgive index (  .63).
Results and Discussion
As expected, participants in the self-control prime condition
were more willing to forgive (M  3.00, SD  0.51) than those in
the control condition (M  2.65, SD  0.70), t(48)  2.03, p 
.04, d  0.57. In short, the present findings provided more direct
evidence for the claim that self-control promotes forgiveness.
Study 2: Trait Self-Control  Trait Forgiveness 3
State Forgiveness
Consistent with both the compensatory and synergistic models,
our two preliminary studies showed that trait and primed self-
control positively relate to forgiveness. In our three primary stud-
ies, we move beyond the main effect of self-control to address our
key goal, which is to test two competing models regarding how
trait self-control interacts with trait concern for the well-being of
others (i.e., trait forgiveness or social value orientation) to predict
forgiveness. To reiterate, the compensatory model suggests that
trait self-control positively relates to forgiveness even in the ab-
sence of a concern for the well-being of others. Likewise, concern
for the well-being of others positively relates to forgiveness even
in the absence of trait self-control. In contrast, the synergistic
model suggests that high levels of trait self-control will predict
higher levels of forgiveness only among those also high in trait
concern for the well-being of others and vice versa (refer to the
bottom panel of Figure 1). To enhance the generalizability of our
results, we tested these competing models by utilizing several
mixed-motive interactions, including a two-alternative prisoner’s
dilemma (Study 2), a continuous give-some dilemma (Study 3),
and a two-alternative maximizing difference game (Study 4).
Method
Participants and protocol. Students (N  95) at a business
school in Singapore participated for course credit. Participants
came to the lab in groups of four and were seated in separate
rooms. Participants first completed the trait forgiveness (M 3.32,
SD  0.61) and trait self-control (M  3.13, SD  0.49) scales
described in Study 1a (s  .89 and .79, respectively). As we
explain below, participants next made a decision in a two-person
prisoner’s dilemma, received false feedback that their partner had
defected, and then completed a state measure of willingness to
forgive their partner.
Prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, participants
were told that they would be randomly assigned to make this
decision with another person in the lab but would not be told which
of the three other students was their partner. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, participants chose between two options: Option A (co-
operation) and Option B (noncooperation). Though we label these
options as “cooperation” and “noncooperation,” at no time in any
study were the options referred to as “cooperation” or “noncoop-
eration” to the participants. Participants were told that if both
chose Option A, then both would get 60¢. However, if the partic-
ipant chose Option A and the partner chose Option B, the partic-
ipant would get 0¢ and the partner would get 100¢. Similarly, if the
participant chose Option B and the partner chose Option A, the
participant would get 100¢ and the partner would get 0¢. Last, if
both chose Option B, each would get 40¢. To build in the antici-
pation of future interactions, we told participants that they would
make the same decision several times and that it was possible for
them to earn much money over the several trials. In fact, partici-
pants made the decision on only two trials (cooperation rates were
49% and 39%, for Trials 1 and 2, respectively).
In Studies 2–4, after the experimenter described the dilemma to
participants, participants responded to four questions assessing
their understanding of the dilemma. The experimenter checked that
all participants answered these questions correctly before partici-
pants made their decisions. Participants were asked to indicate
their choice on a piece of paper, which was collected by the
experimenter, and were then informed of their partner’s choice,
which was always Option B (noncooperation). In addition, partic-
ipants were told how much they earned on each trial. In each study,
participants were paid according to the outcomes of each decision.
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State forgiveness. As an assessment of state forgiveness,
participants completed McCullough et al.’s (1998) Transgression-
Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (TRIM) following the
first trial feedback. The TRIM contains subscales measuring re-
venge and avoidance thoughts and feelings. In the current study,
participants did not complete the avoidance scale, as it was tech-
nically impossible for the participant to avoid (interacting anony-
mously with) the partner. For a similar reason, participants did not
complete a measure of (warmth-based, approach-oriented) benev-
olence motives (cf. McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Thus,
participants completed only the five-item revenge scale (e.g., “I’ll
make him/her pay” and “I’m going to get even”;   .80),
responding to each item on a 5-point scale (1  strongly disagree
to 5  strongly agree). To facilitate a consistent focus on “for-
giveness” throughout the paper, we reverse coded the TRIM re-
venge scores so that higher scores could be interpreted as higher
levels of forgiveness (lower thoughts and feelings of revenge; M
3.71, SD  0.86).
Results and Discussion
To test the compensatory and synergistic models, we used a
two-step hierarchical regression analysis. On Step 1, we entered
trait self-control and trait forgiveness scores. On Step 2, we
entered their interaction. Prior to the analysis, trait self-control and
trait forgiveness were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Results on
Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of trait self-control,  
.24, t(93)  2.22, p  .05, but no effect of trait forgiveness,  
.14, t(93)  1.30, p  .20. More important, on Step 2, results
revealed a marginally significant interaction between trait self-
control and trait forgiveness,   .19, t(92)  1.77, p  .08.
As Figure 2 shows, the interaction matched predictions based on
the compensatory model. To further explore the interaction, we
first tested the simple relationship between trait self-control and
state forgiveness at low (1 SD) and high (1 SD) levels of trait
forgiveness. Results revealed a significant positive relationship
between trait self-control and state forgiveness among those low in
trait forgiveness,   .36, t(92)  2.83, p  .006, but no signif-
icant relationship among those high in trait forgiveness,   .01,
t(92)  0.07, p  .94. Also consistent with the compensatory
model, a second set of simple slope analyses revealed that trait
forgiveness showed a significant positive relationship with state
forgiveness among those low (1 SD) in trait self-control,  
.33, t(92) 2.18, p .03, but no significant relationship with state
forgiveness among those high (1 SD) in trait self-control,  
.02, t(92)  .11, p  .91.2
We also conducted a two-step logistic regression to evaluate
whether trait self-control and trait forgiveness predicted partici-
pants’ choices on Trial 2 of the prisoner’s dilemma. When entered
on the first step, the centered trait self-control and trait forgiveness
scores (as a set) explained a marginally significant amount of
variation in Trial 2 choices, 2(2)  5.34, p  .054. An exami-
nation of the individual predictors revealed that cooperation on
Trial 2 was not related to trait self-control (Wald  0.05, p  .82)
but was positively related to trait forgiveness (Wald  3.39, p 
.047). When added on a second step, the interaction between trait
self-control and trait forgiveness did not explain any additional
variation in cooperation on Trial 2, 2(1)  0.14, p  .74.
If we focus on the forgiveness results, the present findings
provide initial support for the compensatory model, which states
that forgiveness requires being high on either concern with others
(trait forgiveness) or trait self-control but does not require being
high on both traits, as the synergistic model would predict. Addi-
tional analyses showed that trait forgiveness was also associated
with higher levels of cooperation on Trial 2, but (for reasons we
consider in the General Discussion) analysis of the choice data did
not support either interactionist model shown in Figure 1. As we
explain below, Studies 3 and 4 were designed to test the general-
izability of these findings using a conceptually related trait tapping
concern with the well-being of others (social value orientation) and
two additional social dilemma contexts.
Study 3: Trait Self-Control  Social Value
Orientation 3 State Forgiveness (I)
Study 3 complements and extends Study 2 in two ways. First,
we considered an alternative prosocial orientation that is not so
highly conceptually related to the outcome measure of state for-
giveness. Second, to enhance the generalizability of our findings,
we examined forgiveness in a continuous give-some social di-
lemma.
Method
Participants and protocol. Students (N  61) at a business
school in Singapore participated for course credit. Participants
2 We also explored how our primary results on state forgiveness were
impacted when Trial 1 dilemma choice was included as a covariate in the
regression models reported in the text. To begin, Trial 1 choice was a
significant predictor of forgiveness in Study 2 (p  .006), but not in
Studies 3 and 4 (ps  .13 and .73, respectively). In addition, entering Trial
1 choice as a covariate into the primary regression analyses reported in the
text did not fundamentally alter our conclusions. For example, in Study 2,
the marginally significant interaction between trait self-control and trait
forgiveness (p  .08) remained marginally significant when trial 1 choice
was entered into the equation (p  .10), and in Studies 3 and 4, the
significant interaction between trait self-control and social value orienta-
tion (ps  .001 and .02, respectively) remained significant when trial 1
choice was entered into the equation (ps  .02, respectively).
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Figure 2. State forgiveness following defection in a two-alternative pris-
oner’s dilemma as a function of trait forgiveness and trait self-control.
SD  standard deviation.
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came to the lab in groups of four and were seated in separate
rooms. Participants first completed the trait self-control scale de-
scribed in Study 1a (  .90; M 3.13, SD 0.52) and a measure
of social value orientation (described below). Next, participants
made a decision in a two-person give-some social dilemma (de-
scribed below), received false feedback that their partner had
behaved noncooperatively, and then completed the TRIM measure
of state forgiveness described in Study 2 (  .88; M  3.40,
SD  0.91).
Give-some dilemma. After completing the two trait mea-
sures, participants made a decision in a two-person, continuous
give-some dilemma. Participants were told that they would be
randomly assigned to make this decision with another person in the
lab but would not be informed which of the three other students
was their partner. Participants were told that they would make the
same decision several times with the same person and would not
know the number of decision trials. As reinforcement of this idea,
a piece of paper with a column containing 30 rows to indicate the
outcome of each future trial was placed on the participant’s desk,
leading the participant to believe he or she would make 30 deci-
sions. However, each participant made the decision only twice.
In the dilemma, each participant received an endowment of 50¢
and had to decide how much to give to the other person. Partici-
pants were informed that their partner was endowed with the same
amount of money and would be making the same decision simul-
taneously. Participants were told they could give their partner 0,
10, 20, 30, 40, or 50¢ and that any amount given would be doubled
before being allocated to the partner. This is a social dilemma
because the best individual option is to give the partner 0¢ and
claim any amount that the partner gives, but if both partners give
0¢, each one gets only 50¢. This outcome is lower than if each
gives 50¢, which (after doubling) results in 100¢ for each partic-
ipant. Participants indicated their decision privately on a small
piece of paper, which was collected by the experimenter. Next, the
experimenter provided false feedback about the choice of the other
person and told the participant the amount that he or she had
earned on that trial. In fact, each participant was told that the
partner decided to give 10¢ (a relatively noncooperative choice;
mean cooperation for Trials 1 and 2, M  4.43, SD  1.68 and
M  3.66, SD  1.72, respectively).
Triple dominance measure of social value orientation. As
a measure of their prosocial or proself values, participants re-
sponded to a set of nine, three-alternative decomposed games (Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). In one game, partic-
ipants chose among three options. Each option provided points to
the Self and the Other: Option A  500 points to Self, 100 points
to the Other (i.e., a competitive choice, as it offers the biggest
relative gain between one’s own and the other’s outcomes); Option
B  560 points to Self, 300 points to the Other (i.e., an individ-
ualistic choice, as it offers the highest individual gain to self);
Option C  490 points to Self, 490 points to the Other (i.e., a
prosocial choice, as it offers the highest joint gain, highest other
gain, and smallest difference in self–other outcomes).
Although researchers often categorize participants into proso-
cials versus proselfs, it is possible to treat social value orientation
as a continuous variable. To maximize the variance in social value
orientation responses, we elected to treat social value orientation as
a continuous variable, computed as (points allocated to Other
minus points allocated to Self). Calculated as such, higher scores
reflect a greater prosocial orientation (M  129.97, SD 
121.90). As anticipated, the continuous measure was highly cor-
related with the categorical measure, r  .96, t(54)  26.75, p 
.001, and it showed a high internal reliability (  .95).
Results and Discussion
Our primary goal in Study 3 was to further test the compensa-
tory model within a more continuous give-some social dilemma
and with a different measure of concern with others (social value
orientation). We were interested in testing for the hypothesized
interaction between trait self-control and social value orientation in
predicting forgiveness. Prior to our analysis, we again reverse
scored the revenge scale from the TRIM measure of state forgive-
ness so that higher scores would reflect higher levels of forgive-
ness.
As before, to test for the hypothesized interaction, we conducted
a two-step hierarchical regression analysis. On the first step, we
entered the continuous variables of trait self-control and social
value orientation, which had been centered prior to analysis (Aiken
& West, 1991). On the second step, we entered their interaction.
Results on Step 1 revealed that neither main effect was significant
(ps  .33). However, conceptually replicating the findings from
Study 2, results on Step 2 indicated that the two-way interaction
between trait self-control and social value orientation was signif-
icant,   .46, t(57) 3.88, p .001. As shown in Figure 3, the
interaction matched predictions based on the compensatory model.
To further explore the interaction, we first tested the simple rela-
tionship between trait self-control and state forgiveness at low (1
SD; proself) and high (1 SD; prosocial) levels of social value
orientation. Results revealed a significant positive relationship
between trait self-control and state forgiveness among proselfs,
  .47, t(57) 3.21, p .002. Results also revealed a significant
negative relationship between trait self-control and state forgive-
ness among prosocials,   .39, t(57)  2.19, p  .03. Also
consistent with the compensatory model, a second set of simple
slope analyses revealed a significant positive relationship between
social value orientation and state forgiveness among those low
(1 SD) in trait self-control,   .55, t(57)  3.45, p  .001.
Results also revealed a marginally significant negative relationship
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Figure 3. State forgiveness following defection in a continuous give-
some dilemma as a function of social value orientation and trait self-
control. SD  standard deviation.
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between social value orientation and forgiveness among those high
(1 SD) in trait self-control,   .33, t(57)  1.97, p  .053.
We also conducted a two-step regression analysis to evaluate
whether trait self-control and social value orientation predicted
participants’ choices on Trial 2 of the give-some dilemma. When
entered on the first step, the centered trait self-control and social
value orientation scores (as a set) explained a significant amount of
variation in Trial 2 choices, R2  .20, F(2, 58)  7.40, p  .001.
An examination of the individual predictors revealed that cooper-
ation on Trial 2 was not related to trait self-control,   .07,
t(58)  0.62, p  .54, but was positively related to social value
orientation,   .46, t(58)  3.85, p  .001. When added on a
second step, the interaction between trait self-control and social
value orientation did not explain any additional variation in coop-
eration on Trial 2, R2  .01, F(1, 57)  0.71, p  .40.
The state forgiveness results of Study 3 provide additional
support for the compensatory model. The hypothesized positive
relationship between trait self-control and state forgiveness oc-
curred only among individuals with a proself value orientation.
Among prosocials, interestingly, there was an unpredicted signif-
icant negative relationship between trait self-control and state
forgiveness. Although we find this to be an interesting result, we
refrain from speculating about it until this somewhat counterintui-
tive effect can be replicated. Also, conceptually similar to Study 2,
analysis of the choice data revealed a significant relationship
between social value orientation and Trial 2 choices but no effect
for trait self-control or the interaction between self-control and
social value orientation (an issue to which we return in the General
Discussion).
Study 4: Trait Self-Control  Social Value
Orientation 3 State Forgiveness (II)
Our goal in Study 4 was to provide a more stringent test of the
compensatory and synergistic models within a relatively stronger
situation. Recall that Study 2 tested the two models in the context
of a two-person prisoner’s dilemma, and Study 3 tested the models
in the context of a two-person give-some game. Although the two
games differed in the way people made their choice (selecting one
of two options vs. giving money to a partner), both games had the
underlying structure of a prisoner’s dilemma. That is, in both
games, noncooperation “dominated” cooperation for individual-
ists, competitors, and aggressors, but mutual noncooperation led to
suboptimal joint outcomes.
In Study 4, we tested the compensatory versus synergistic mod-
els in the context of a maximizing difference game (McClintock &
McNeel, 1966), which can be viewed as a stronger situation. To
illustrate why we consider the maximizing difference game a
“stronger situation” than the prisoner’s dilemma, Figure 4 presents
the two-person, two-alternative versions of the prisoner’s dilemma
game from Study 2 and the two-person, two-alternative maximiz-
ing difference game from Study 4 (the most directly comparable
games). As noted in the introduction, in a prisoner’s dilemma, the
cooperative option appeals to altruists and cooperators because it
maximizes the partner’s gain, joint gain, and equality, and the
noncooperative option appeals to individualists, competitors, and
aggressors because it maximizes individual gain and relative gain
and minimizes the partner’s gain (Van Lange, De Cremer, et al.,
2007). By comparison, in a maximizing difference game, the
cooperative option appeals to altruists, cooperators, and individu-
alists because it maximizes the partner’s gain, joint gain, equality,
and own gain, but the noncooperative option appeals to competi-
tors and aggressors only because it maximizes relative gain and
minimizes the partner’s gain. Restated, in the prisoner’s dilemma,
noncooperation could mean that a partner is individualistic,
whereas in the maximizing difference game noncooperation is
much more pernicious because it implies that the partner is either
competitive or aggressive. In fact, previous research supports this
argument, as the noncooperative alternative in the maximizing
difference game is judged to be much less moral than the nonco-
operative alternative in the prisoner’s dilemma (Joireman, Kuhl-
man, Van Lange, Doi, & Shelley, 2003). Moreover, based purely
on the base rates for different social value orientations (Au &
Kwong, 2004), nearly everyone should chose to cooperate in the
maximizing difference game, making noncooperation a quite un-
usual and salient form of “norm violation.” Given this, we rea-
soned that forgiveness should be harder in the maximizing differ-
ence game, which might work against our ability to support the
compensatory interaction (and might lead to stronger support for
the synergistic model, given that it assumes that both traits are
needed for forgiveness). Thus, it is reasonable to ask, does self-
control positively relate to forgiveness among proselfs even when
noncooperation implies competition or aggression? Study 4 was
designed to find out.
Method
Participants and protocol. Students (N  66) from a busi-
ness school in Singapore participated for course credit. Participants
Figure 4. Social value orientation (SVO) motives for selecting top and
bottom rows in prisoner’s dilemma and maximizing difference games.
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came to the lab in groups of four and were seated in separate
rooms. Participants first completed the trait self-control scale (de-
scribed in Study 1a;   .90; M  3.12, SD  0.48) and the
decomposed games measure of social value orientation (described
in Study 3; M  124.29, SD  127.05). As in Study 3, the
continuous measure was highly correlated with the categorical
measure, r  .96, t(55)  23.74, p  .001, and it showed a high
internal reliability (  .95). Next, participants made a decision in
a two-person maximizing difference game, received false feedback
that their partner had defected, and then completed the revenge
scale from the TRIM measure of state forgiveness described in
Study 2 (  .76; M  3.12, SD  0.73).
Maximizing difference game. In the maximizing difference
game, participants were told that they would be randomly assigned
to make this decision with another person in the lab but would not
be informed which of the three other students was their partner. In
the maximizing difference game, participants chose between two
options: Option A (cooperation) and Option B (noncooperation).
Participants were told that if both people chose Option A, then
both would get 100¢. However, if the participant chose Option A
and the partner chose Option B, the participant would get 0¢ and
the partner would get 60¢. Similarly, if the participant chose
Option B and the partner chose Option A, the participant would get
60¢ and the partner would get 0¢. Last, if both chose Option B,
each would get 0¢. The arrangement of payoffs meant that the only
motives for choosing Option B were to maximize the relative gain
over the partner (competition) or minimize the partner’s outcomes
(aggression).
To build in the anticipation of future interactions, we told
participants that they would make the same decision several times
and that it was possible for them to earn much money over the
several trials. In fact, participants made the decision twice (coop-
eration rates were 95% and 76%, for Trials 1 and 2, respectively).
Results and Discussion
Primary analysis. Our goal in Study 4 was to offer a final
test of the compensatory model within the context of a maximizing
difference game. Prior to our analysis, we again reverse scored the
revenge scale from the TRIM measure of state forgiveness, so that
higher scores would reflect higher levels of forgiveness, and we
tested for the hypothesized interaction using a two-step hierarchi-
cal regression analysis. On the first step, we entered the continuous
variables of trait self-control and social value orientation, which
had been centered prior to analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). On the
second step, we entered their interaction. Results on Step 1 re-
vealed that neither main effect was significant (ps  .15). How-
ever, conceptually replicating the findings from Studies 3 and 4, on
Step 2, the two-way interaction between trait self-control and
social value orientation was significant,   .31, t(60) 2.46,
p  .02. As shown in Figure 5, the interaction matched predictions
based on the compensatory model. To further explore the interac-
tion, we first tested the simple relationship between trait self-
control and state forgiveness at low (1 SD; proself) and high (1
SD; prosocial) levels of social value orientation. Results revealed
a significant positive relationship between trait self-control and
state forgiveness among proselfs,   .44, t(60)  2.77, p  .008,
and no significant relationship between trait self-control and state
forgiveness among prosocials,   .15, t(60)  0.82, p  .41.
Also supporting the compensatory model, a second set of simple
slope analyses indicated that social value orientation showed a
positive relationship with state forgiveness among those low (1
SD) in trait self-control,   .30, t(60)  1.71, p  .09, and
self-control showed a negative relationship with state forgiveness
among those high (1 SD) in trait self-control,   .29, t(60) 
1.76, p  .09, though neither simple slope met traditional levels
of significance.
We also conducted a two-step logistic regression analysis to
evaluate whether trait self-control and social value orientation
predicted participants’ choices on Trial 2 of the maximizing dif-
ference game. When entered on the first step, the centered trait
self-control and social value orientation (as a set) did not explain
a significant amount of variation in Trial 2 choices, 2(2)  1.76,
p  .42. However, when added on a second step, the interaction
between trait self-control and social value orientation did explain
significant variation in Trial 2 choices, 2(1) 4.16, Wald 3.84,
p  .05. When we examined the simple slopes, at high levels of
social value orientation, self-control had a marginally significant
positive relation with cooperation (b  0.32, p  .06). At low
levels of social value orientation, however, self-control did not
predict cooperation (b  0.14, p  .42).
Prisoner’s dilemma vs. maximizing difference game. One
of our main goals in the present study was to determine whether
the interaction uncovered in Studies 2 and 3 (based on a prisoner’s
dilemma game structure) would generalize to the maximizing
difference game. We judged this to be an interesting question
because, as we explained earlier, noncooperation in the maximiz-
ing difference game should be harder to forgive than noncooper-
ation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, primarily because people
should expect more cooperation in the maximizing difference
game; thus, noncooperation should be seen as quite counternor-
mative. As an evaluation of these assumptions, in Studies 2 and 4,
just prior to making their first choice, participants indicated if they
expected their partner to choose Option A (cooperate) or Option B
(defect).
As anticipated, participants were significantly more likely to
expect their partner to cooperate in the maximizing difference
game (85%) than in the prisoner’s dilemma game (45%), r	  .43,
2  27.47, p  .001, and cooperation was significantly higher in
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Figure 5. State forgiveness following defection in a two-alternative max-
imizing difference game as a function of social value orientation and trait
self-control. SD  standard deviation.
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the maximizing difference game (95%) than in the prisoner’s
dilemma game (50%), r	  .52, 2  38.04, p  .001. Also
consistent with our reasoning, state forgiveness was significantly
lower in the maximizing difference game (M  3.11, SD  0.73)
than in the prisoner’s dilemma game (M  3.71, SD  0.82),
t(169)  4. 67, p  .001, d  0.75. Finally, a mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) indicated that the differences between
the maximizing difference and prisoner’s dilemma games on for-
giveness was mediated by expected cooperation (indirect effect 
.15, p  .03), indicating that higher expectations of cooperation in
the maximizing difference (vs. the prisoner’s dilemma) game
contributed to the lower levels for forgiveness in the maximizing
difference game in Study 4. In sum, a comparison of the prisoner’s
dilemma and maximizing difference games used in Studies 2 and
4 suggests that forgiveness was indeed more difficult in the max-
imizing difference game, due to the fact that noncooperation in the
maximizing difference game was judged to be much less likely
than noncooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Despite this,
the compensatory model was again upheld.
Study 4 provides additional support for the compensatory
model. In particular, the hypothesized positive relationship be-
tween trait self-control and state forgiveness occurred only among
individuals with a proself value orientation. That the interaction
generalized to the maximizing difference game is important be-
cause, as we have argued, the maximizing difference game repre-
sents a “stronger situation.” As illustrated in Figure 4, noncoop-
eration in the maximizing difference game (Study 4) constitutes a
stronger norm violation than noncooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma game (Study 2), because (based on its incentive structure)
virtually everyone should cooperate in the maximizing difference
(as cooperation dominates noncooperation for altruists, coopera-
tors, and individualists). Supporting this line of argument, ex-
pected and actual levels of cooperation were significantly higher in
the maximizing difference game used in Study 4 than they were in
the prisoner’s dilemma game used in Study 2; forgiveness was
significantly lower in the maximizing difference than the prison-
er’s dilemma game; and mediation analysis showed that height-
ened expectations of cooperation in the maximizing difference
game helped to explain why forgiveness was lower in the maxi-
mizing difference game. All of this suggests that the maximizing
difference game used in Study 4 was a “stronger situation.” Again,
this is important, because if a strong situation elicits a relatively
uniform set of expectations and behavior, as occurred in the
maximizing difference game, this can reduce the impact of per-
sonality on behavior (Cooper & Withey, 2009; Mischel, 1977).
Despite this, using the maximizing difference game, we replicated
the interaction between trait self-control and social value orienta-
tion in predicting willingness to forgive a noncooperative partner.
General Discussion
The present research tested two competing models specifying
how trait concern with the well-being of others (trait forgiveness,
social value orientation) and trait self-control interact to predict
forgiveness. The compensatory model predicts that forgiveness
requires being high on concern for others or on self-control,
whereas the synergistic model predicts that forgiveness requires
both high concern for others and high self-control. Two initial
studies confirmed the basic importance of self-control, showing
that trait and primed self-control predict forgiveness. Three addi-
tional studies showed that willingness to forgive a noncooperative
partner in a prisoner’s dilemma, a give-some game, and a maxi-
mizing difference game was best predicted by the compensatory
model. Among proselfs or those low in trait forgiveness, trait
self-control was positively related to forgiveness, suggesting that
self-control can compensate for a lack of concern with others’
well-being. The present findings advance our understanding of
forgiveness and highlight several promising directions for future
research.
Contribution to the Forgiveness Literature
The current research extends the forgiveness literature in at least
three ways. First, we provide evidence that higher levels of trait
self-control predict higher levels of forgiveness. Although Wor-
thington, Berry, and Parrott (2001) have implicated
conscientiousness-based virtues, including self-control, as vital
motivational determinates of forgiveness, most prior research has
examined warmth-based virtues, such as empathy (McCullough et
al., 1997, 1998; Worthington et al., 2000) and relationship com-
mitment (Finkel et al., 2002; Karremans, Van Lange, & Holland,
2005). Relatively little research has explored the role of self-
control (for exceptions, see Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Pronk et al.,
2010; Righetti et al., 2011). Across five studies, using varied
methodologies, we provided consistent support that trait self-
control positively relates to forgiveness.3
Second, applying an interdependence theoretical framework, we
advanced and tested two competing models concerning how self-
control and concern with the well-being of others interact to
predict forgiveness. To date, most research on the forgiving per-
sonality has focused on the main effect of concern for others
(Brose, Rye, Lutz-Zois, & Ross, 2005; Leach & Lark, 2004; for a
review, see Mullet, Neto, & Riviere, 2005) or self-control (Finkel
& Campbell, 2001; Pronk et al., 2010; Righetti et al., 2011) on
forgiveness. More recently, personality researchers have acknowl-
edged the importance of considering how multiple personality
traits interact to predict stable patterns of thought, feeling, and
behavior. To our knowledge, we are the first to apply such a
framework to understanding the forgiving personality.
Third, the social dilemma paradigm we employed provides
much needed insight into forgiveness immediately following an
actual transgression. To date, the majority of research on forgive-
ness has been based on retrospective self-reports or intentions to
forgive in hypothetical scenarios. In light of this trend, Pronk et al.
(2010) have argued that researchers should begin exploring the
relationship between personality and forgiveness immediately fol-
lowing a transgression. The lab-based social dilemmas we used
offer one promising methodology for addressing this call. As we
outlined in the introduction, social dilemmas offer a rich context
within which to study forgiveness, due to their pervasive nature
and ability to elicit competing motives relevant to forgiveness
(such as a desire for revenge vs. forgiveness). Although lab-based
3 Because the main effect of self-control on state forgiveness was in-
consistent across studies, we utilized a meta-analytic technique to estimate
the average correlation across studies. Averaging across the three studies,
we found a significant positive relationship between self-control and the
state measure of forgiveness, r  .26, 95% CI [.14, .38].
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social dilemmas are an experimentally created game, as we have
noted, people become quite angry when others do not cooperate in
these social dilemmas, which speaks to the ecological validity of
this paradigm. Moreover, by using three different types of dilem-
mas, we enhanced the generalizability of our findings across
multiple settings. Despite these advantages, future research should
examine if the patterns we observed in the lab using a social
dilemma paradigm extend to other settings using additional meth-
odologies for assessing forgiveness.
Compensatory vs. Synergistic Models
As noted, we found consistent support for the compensatory
model of forgiveness, suggesting that self-control can compensate
for an individual’s lack of concern for others. These findings hold
several implications for our understanding of forgiveness.
McCullough (2000, 2001) viewed forgiveness as a fundamentally
motivational process. The compensatory model assumes, impor-
tantly, that the two underlying dimensions driving forgiveness are
both related to motivational processes (social and temporal moti-
vations; see Figure 1). The synergistic model, by comparison,
assumes that only one of its underlying dimensions reflects moti-
vation; the other reflects an ability to self-regulate behavior but
does not necessarily include a motivation to forgive. Therefore, the
synergistic model predicts that a proself individual with high
self-control will show low levels of forgiveness, given that self-
control provides the ability (but not the motivation) to forgive.
Conversely, the (consistently supported) compensatory model as-
sumes that a proself individual with high self-control will show
high levels of forgiveness, given that his or her self-control reflects
a concern with his or her own long-term self-interest.
The present findings suggest that researchers interested in un-
derstanding the relationship between self-control and forgiveness
should consider the possibility that self-control is both an enabler
and a motivator of forgiveness. Prior research on the relationship
between self-control and forgiveness has typically viewed self-
control as a mental capacity/ability/resource that facilitates self-
regulated behavior (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Pronk et al., 2010;
Righetti et al., 2011). We do not dispute that these capacities,
abilities, and resources may aid in the process of forgiveness.
Indeed, an abundance of research demonstrates that trait and state
self-control can impact an individual’s ability to self-regulate
thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatz-
isarantis, 2010). That said, we argue that there is an additional
motivating component to trait self-control that has been over-
looked in prior research on forgiveness. Beyond a general mental
capacity, self-control, broadly defined, is related to other mental
processes, such as setting goals, monitoring progress toward goals,
and thinking about the future consequences of behavior. In the
present paper, we tested one important implication of this reason-
ing, reflected in the compensatory model: namely, that trait self-
control could motivate forgiveness even among those who were
not concerned with the well-being of others.
At the same time, we did not test the mechanisms responsible
for this effect. Accordingly, future research could profitably build
on our work by digging more deeply into how, exactly, self-control
relates to forgiveness among proselfs. Worthington et al. (2001)
suggested that self-control may relate to forgiveness either by
inhibiting destructive impulses or by regulating negative emotions.
One way that proselfs high in self-control may inhibit revenge
motives is by thinking about how others are instrumental in at-
taining valued goals (e.g., Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009). Consistent
with this hypothesis, one of the more intriguing findings in the
social value orientation literature is that the link between relation-
ship commitment and willingness to sacrifice in close relationships
is stronger among proselfs (individualists) than it is among proso-
cials (Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997). This pattern of findings,
in combination with our own, reinforces the idea that individualists
can be motivated to behave cooperatively when it is in their
long-term self-interest.
Viewing the compensatory model from a different perspective,
we found that a prosocial orientation buffers the negative impact of
low self-control. It may be that prosocials (or those high in trait
forgiveness) forgive in an heuristic/automatic fashion or possess
emotion regulation strategies that require few if any regulatory
resources. This view is bolstered by recent research showing that
those concerned with the well-being of others do not require
self-control resources to value another’s outcomes (Balliet &
Joireman, 2010), to accommodate (Perunovic & Holmes, 2008), or
to forgive an interaction partner (Karremans & Aarts, 2007).
Future research could profitably extend our work by examining
precisely how a prosocial orientation enhances forgiveness in the
absence of self-control.
Can Forgiveness Be Selfish?
Another direction for future research would be to further explore
whether forgiveness can be motivated by selfish concerns. Rich-
ards (1988) argued that forgiveness can occur only out of concern
for others and that self-interest cannot motivate forgiveness. Sim-
ilarly, the idea that forgiveness can be motivated by long-term
self-interest may seem inconsistent with the common conception
that forgiveness is fundamentally a moral response that advances
the well-being of one’s partner (e.g., an altruistic gift, Worthing-
ton, 1998) or a volitional decision to free the partner from an
implied debt (Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998). These points
notwithstanding, there is nothing included in contemporary psy-
chological definitions of forgiveness that rules out self-interest as
a possible motivator. By providing consistent support for the
compensatory model of forgiveness, our results suggest that trait
self-control can indeed motivate forgiveness due to a concern with
one’s own long-term interest (i.e., among proselfs). However, we
recognize that our reasoning is speculative and in need of further
testing. In particular, as we noted earlier, future research is needed
to tease out the mechanism responsible for self-control’s relation-
ship with forgiveness. In addition, it would be interesting to
explore how forgiveness is perceived by the transgressor when it is
acknowledged that forgiveness results from self-interest motives.
Because people tend to respond positively and trust others more
when a partner’s behavior is perceived to deviate from self-interest
(e.g., Murray & Holmes, 2009; Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011), the
effectiveness of forgiveness for deterring repeated offenses may
decrease when forgiveness is perceived to have resulted from
self-interest motives.
Limitations and Future Directions
Before closing, we consider three limitations of the present
research and outline several directions for future research. To start,
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although we tested the compensatory versus synergistic models in
both weaker situations (prisoner’s dilemma games in Studies 2 and
3) and stronger situations (maximizing difference game in Study
4), noncooperation in the maximizing difference game might still
be considered a weak situation relative to other, more severe
transgressions (e.g., a marital affair). Under more extreme circum-
stances, it is possible that individuals require both a prosocial
orientation and self-control in order to forgive. For example, in
these more severe transgressions, prosocial individuals may not be
able to rely on their heuristic response to a partner’s transgression
under such extreme circumstances. Under such conditions, their
self-control is instrumental in overriding their impulse to exact
revenge. More generally, this raises the question of whether lab-
based experimental games can prove to be viable paradigms with
which to study responses to norm violations in relationships. Even
though these paradigms have been used to predict behaviors out-
side the lab (Bem & Lord, 1979; Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, &
Van Vugt, 2007), future research should test the generalizability of
our reports using responses to even more severe transgressions
outside the lab.
Second, it is important to note that we used state revenge as an
index of forgiveness but that prior measures of forgiveness have
also incorporated avoidance and (approach-based) benevolence
motives (McCullough et al., 2003). As we explained in Study 2,
we believed that avoidance and benevolence motives were not
highly relevant in our social dilemma paradigms because, techni-
cally, participants would never actually meet, and it was thus
impossible for them to avoid (or approach) their partner. Addi-
tionally, positive and negative dimensions of forgiveness are mod-
erately correlated (e.g., between .40 and .50; McCullough et
al., 1997; Rye et al., 2001). This suggests that the patterns ob-
served in the present study (using avoidance) could generalize to a
broader array of forgiveness contexts. Still, the lack of avoidance
and benevolence motives potentially limits the generalizability of
our findings, and future researchers are encouraged to incorporate
these additional dimensions of forgiveness. For example,
McCullough et al. (2003) suggested that benevolence may require
more self-control than do avoidance and revenge motives. If so,
then the synergistic model may find stronger support when for-
giveness is defined in terms of benevolence motives after a trans-
gression.
On that note, it is relevant to recall that although the compen-
satory model consistently explained self-reported revenge motives,
it did not predict Trial 2 social dilemma choice behavior. Several
aspects of the dilemma paradigm may explain this. First, it is
possible that a single subsequent social dilemma trial was not long
enough to translate revenge motives into behavior. Second, al-
though self-reported thoughts and feelings of revenge may be
relatively immediate, a variety of additional factors may have
influenced Trial 2 behavior, including the possibility that people
attributed their partner’s noncooperative choice on Trial 1 to
“noise” and/or misunderstandings and were thus willing (at least
temporarily) to extend some generosity on Trial 2 (e.g., Van
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). Accordingly, future re-
search testing the compensatory and synergistic models across a
variety of different contexts, including those containing noise,
could greatly add to the insights provided by our initial test of
these models. One interesting paradigm, in particular, would be the
dictator’s game (e.g., Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). In this game,
participants are given full control over how much money to allo-
cate to their anonymous partner, who simply must accept whatever
amount is allocated. Because the partner has no ability to retaliate
(or reject the offer, as in the ultimatum game), it is possible that in
this context, forgiveness may require both the motivation and the
ability to forgive.
A final issue to consider is whether desire to respond in a
socially desirability manner, or mood, may have led to relation-
ships between our constructs. In line with the former, each of the
traits studied here has been linked with higher tendency to respond
in a socially desirable fashion (e.g., Iedema & Poppe,1994; Tang-
ney et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005). On the other hand, the
fact that a given trait correlates with scores on a social desirability
scale does not necessarily mean that a person is lying (McCrae &
Costa, 1983). Nevertheless, future research controlling for social
desirability would shed additional light on this question. With
regard to mood effects, state forgiveness is positively related to
positive moods (r  .13) and negatively related to negative moods
(r  .27; Fehr et al., 2010). To the extent that our manipulation
in Study 1b or our constructs of interest relate positively with
positive mood (or inversely with negative mood), such mood
effects may partly account for our findings. Future research as-
sessing mood as a potential mediator would help advance our
understanding of how self-control and a prosocial orientation
combine to predict forgiveness.
Conclusion
Building on interdependence theory analyses of accommodation
and forgiveness (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Finkel & Rusbult,
2008; Pronk et al., 2010), we identified individual differences in
concern with the well-being of others and self-control as motiva-
tors of forgiveness. In prior research, self-control has been treated
as an ability. In the present studies, we argued that self-control
may also reflect future-oriented, self-interested motivation. Be-
cause trait self-control underlies both concern for the future and
self-regulatory ability, we were able to test two competing models
of how these personality factors may jointly predict forgiveness,
the compensatory and synergistic models. Across five studies, trait
self-control was, as expected, positively related to forgiveness.
More important, this relationship existed only among individuals
with a low concern for the well-being of others (proselfs or those
low in trait forgiveness). These findings support a compensatory
model of forgiveness, suggesting that self-control can motivate
forgiveness among people with a low concern with the well-being
of others. Given that a notable percentage of the population can be
characterized as “proselfs” (i.e., 38%; Au & Kwong, 2004), this is
good news for forgiveness. In light of these findings, future re-
search should explore ways to promote forgiveness by enhancing
self-control (e.g., Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). Given the
many benefits of forgiveness, such work could go a long way in
promoting healthy and satisfying relationships, even among those
not dispositionally concerned with the well-being of others.
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